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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
AUTOMOTIVE PRODUCTS
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 12790

PROVO CITY CORPORATION
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is 1an action in equity, in which the
owner of real property brought suit against the
City for compensation for the taking of private
property to widen a City Street.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court sitting without a jury determined
that there had been a taking by Provo City of
a strip of .property belonging to the PlaintiffRespondent, and awarded damages in the nature
of compensation for the taking of property under the power of Eminent Domain.
After judgment was granted, Appellant
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filed a motion for the taking of evidence
on the issue of whether or not the Court should
have granted an off-set for claimed special benefits conferred on the property by the taking, the
Court determined that such an off-set would be
applicable only if there had been severance damage granted and not against the amount decreed
by the Court as compensation for the taking.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellant seeks reversal of that portion
of the Judgment finding that there was a taking
of the Respondent's property by the Appellant,
Appellant claiming that specific actions of the
Respondent constituted a dedication of the strip
in question for street purposes to the public.
Appellant also seeks reversal of the portion
of the decision which disallowed off-set benefits
conferred on the Respondent's property, because
no severance damages were a warded.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Respondent is the owner of three
adjacent parcels of property on the South side
of 1230 North Street, the first parcel being util·
ized as a service station lot at the intersection
of 1230 North Street rand University Avenue, the
second and third parcels being located immedi·
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ately adjacent and to the east, the middle parcel
being utilized for two businesses, one, a donut
shop and the other a
and dry cleaning
center. The eastern-most parcel being the most
recently built on, accommodates at the present
time a retail business selling Mexican food.
The property in question was acquired by
the Respondent in 1946 at which time the property was occupied by older style residences
which the Respondent eventually removed and
replaced with business buildings.
In 1955 the City commenced a comprehensive widening project of 1230 North Street in
conformity with the Master Street Plan of the
City (Trial transcript, page 40 and 18,) and after
that year all new buildings in the area were required to set back to make pr.ovision for a street
having 1a width of 100 feet (Trial transcript page
37, 38 and 72).
In 1959, the Respondent applied for a building permit and pursuant to the permit which was
issued, erected a commercial building on the
middle parcel .of property owned by it and in
doing so set back to adhere to the requirements
of the City for street widening (Trial transcript
page 69). Prior to that time, the City (or County) had black-topped approximately thirty feet
1
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of street ·width leaving a strip approximately
twenty-eight feet in v:idth between the South
edge of the black top and the proposed
line in a graveled, but otherwise unimprm·ed
condition. (See Trial transcript
32). Thi 5
area was used by the public for parking of
and for vehicle tra ,·el.
The south thirteen feet of the twenty-eight
foot strip is the subject of this suit. Prior to August 17, 1967, the thirteen foot strip \r,·as also oc·
cupied by a line of utility poles (Trial transcript.
page 79 and 97).
In October, 1962, Respondent leased the property on the corner of University A venue and 1230
North Street to Standard Oil Company (Trial
transcript page 76, 80, and 81).
Frank Earl, President of the Respondent
Corporation, together with the Oil Company pre·
sented a plan for a service station to the City.
which was required to be modified to adhere to
set back requirements before a building permit
was issued. The developers of the station in·
stalled at their °''·n expense, curb, gutter, and
hard surfacing, in line with the adjoining street
improvements, all of ·which adhere to the planned
100 feet street width.
On August 17, 1967, the City, pursuant to a
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notice of the intent to install special improvements, installed curb and gutter in front of
the other parcels of ground owned by the
Plaintiff, in line with and conforming to the
curb lines established by the service station operator on the western most parcel. The City also
installed strip paving approximately twentyeight feet in width joining the existing paving
in the center of the street and abutting the new
curb and gutter installed in the same improvement district.
They did not install a sidewalk because the
tenants of the Respondent had a metal fence installed parallel to the street right-of-way, approximately twelve feet South of the Respondent's property line in such a way that one additional foot of property would be required in order
to install a full width sidewalk, the City Engineer
and one of the members of the City Commission
contacted the prDperty owner requesting sale
by the property owner of an additional one foot
(including the property where the fence was located) to accommodate a standard width side\Valk. (See Trial transcript page 98). Respondent was subsequently assessed the cost of installing all the improvements, except the sidewalk
\Vhich Respondent has subsequently installed at

6
its expense.

(Trial transcript page 102.)

The Court sitting without a jury found that
the Respondent was the owner of the North
thirteen feet of the pr.operty and found that there
was a taking which occurred on or 1about the 1st
day of January, 1969, a;nd that no compensation
was paid for the taking 1and assessed damages for
the thirteen foot strip as follows:
1. The Westerly 130 feet by 13 feet (in front
of the service station) at $4.50 per square foot.
2. The Easterly 141 feet by 13 feet at $3.50
per square feet.
The judgment including interest from and
after J1anuary 1, 1969, (see Memorandum Deci·
sion-designation of record on appeal No. 5).
ARGUMENT
Point I
MAY A CITY AS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO THE GRANTING OF
A BUILDING PERMIT, REQUIRE A
PROPERTY OWNER TO SET BACK A
DISTANCE BEHIND HIS PROPERTY
LINE TO WIDEN THE ABUTTING
STREET TO CONFORM WITH THE
STREET WIDTH SHOWN ON THE
CITY'S 11ASTER PLAN OF STREETS?
A City in the State of Utah has not only
a duty but the prerequisite authority to widen
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streets pursuant to an adopted M1ajor Street
Plan. Authorization for the City to have such a
plan and the effect that it has upon property is
set forth in Section 10-9-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. That Section says in part:
". . . the legislative body may make,
from time to time, other additions to or
modification of the Official Map by placing thereon the lines of proposed new
streets or street extensions, widenings,
narrowings or vtacations which have been
accurately surveyed iand definitely located; ... the placing of 1any street or
street lines upon the Official Map shall
not in and of itself constitute or be
deemed to constitute the opening or establishment of any street or the taking
or acceptance of any 11and for street purposes ... "
Early approval of an Official Map act which
prohibited the issuance of permits in the beds
of mapped streets and upheld the power and
even the obligation of the Municipality to reserve
streets rights-of-way was succinctly stated in
the case of Ileadly vs. Rochester, 272 New York
197, 5 Northeast 2 ( d) 198 (1936) quoted in the
American Law of Zoning, Anderson, Section
20.03 at page 516,517.
The Court in the He.adly case viewed the
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official street plan as a compromise between permitting of uncontrolled development on one hand
and requiring the City to acquire the land
through purchase or condemnation on the other.
The first vvas considered ineffective, the second was reg;::irded as impractical, the compromise
served the integrity of the street plan while it
left the land owner free to sell, use and develop
his land subject to reasonable limitations.
Thirty years after Headly, the principles
announced in thiat case were seriously reviewed
in context of a case involving the official map of
the same city. The official map of the City of
Rochester was challenged by a property owner
who argued that a 14 foot set-back which was
required to avoid construction in the bed of a
mapped street amounted to a taking, inasmuch
as he would be required to replan a projected
building and incur extra expense; the Map where
it encroached upon the Plaintiff's land was in·
tended to pr.ovide land for street widening. The
Court upheld the Map and denied relief. It found
that the six percent extra cost demonstrated by
the landowner was trivial when compared to
the injury to the public welfare which would
result if the City were prevented from planning
for the future needs of the community. (Roches-
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ter Business Institute, Inc. vs. Rochester, 25 App.
Div. 2 (d) 97, 267 NYS 2 (d) 274 (1966) see other
cases quoted in the American Law of Zoning,
Section 20.03, page 518).
A number of other courts from various jurisdictions have upheld street widening projects
even though they inhibited the manner in which
property could be developed (Miami vs. Romer,
73 So. 2 ( d) 285, (1964 Florida) H,amer vs. State
Highway Commission 304 SW. 2 ( d) 869, 1957
Missouri). A Wisconsin Court deteeted no taking for a public use where a property owner was
denied a permit to build in a map,ped street (Miller vs. Ma:nders, 2 Wisconsin 2 ( d) 365, 86 NW
2 (d) 469 (1957), see also Hilltop Properties, Inc.
vs. State, 233 Cal. App. 2 ( d) 349, 43 Cal. Rptr.
605 (1965).
The Utah Code provision found in 10-9-24
permits the Legislative body of the City to deny
permits for any building or structure or part
thereof on any land, located between the mapped
lines of the streets shown on an Official Map
and is quoted in the Americian Law of Zoning,
Section 20.14, page 536 as a representative provision to aid in an orderly development of property within a municipality and at the same time
safeguard the rights of the property owner. In
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the Headly vs. Rochester case it was urged that

the Official Map was confiscatory in that a
landowner could not obtain 1a permit to build on
a portion of his land which lay within the bed of
a mapped street, the court upheld the restriction
saymg:
"the mere adopton of a general plan or
miap showing streets and parks to be
layed out or widened in the future without acquisition by the City of title ...
can be of little benefit to the public if
the development of the land abutting
upon and in the bed of the pro.posed
streets proceeds in a haphazard way,
without taking into account the general
plan adopted ... such restrictions (mapping and permits) are calculated to
promote at least the public convenience
... and to benefit the district in which
the land is situated, as well as the City
itself ... "
1

The Court further indicated that to require
the immediate exercise of the power of Emi·
nent Domain would hamper the
in planning for future development of the community.
It is incumbent on the landowner to sho"

some loss to himself other than the actual prop
erty involved in the street widening project i1
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order to qualify himself for compensation under
this theory. In the ciase now before the Court the
widening project made feasible, development of
the property for commercial purposes and there
was no showing by the property owner that the
widening of the street had done anything except
improve his property for those commercial purposes. His actions in complying with the street
widening project were similar to those of a subdivider, who in order to quialify himself under
State Law and City Ordinances is required to
set aside public streets as a part of his subdivision plat (See 57-5-4, UCA, 1953 as amended).
Our State Law makes it a misdemeanor for a
subdivider to sell any property within an anticipated subdivision before the recordation of the
plat (see 57-5-5, UCA, 1953 as amended).
The Trial Court erred as to the law in assuming that the action of the City in requiring a
property owner to set back as a prerequisite to
the issuing of a building permit was "coercion"
on the part of the City (see Tdal Transcript,
page 145). Under that theory anyone who had
been "forced" to give a street within a
under 57-5-5, UCA, ought to be entitled to bring
a "reverse condemnation" suit, as in this instance, against the City in equity, and claim com-
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pensation for any land so "a.ppropriated" to the
use of the public. It is immediately manifest that
this type of legal theory would quickly bankrupt
every municipality, county, and state in the Nation and unjustly enrich the subdivider and property owner, whom ias a matter of fact is the
prime beneficiary and user of the public streets.
POINT II
DOES THE INSTALLATION OF
CURB AND GUTTER BY A PROPERTY OWNER AMOUNT TO A DEDICATION OF PROPERTY FOR STREET
WIDENING PURPOSES?
The evidence before the Court in this case
indiciates that the Respondent, as it piece by
piece, developed its property, acquiesced to a
planned street widening and built upon each of
the three lots owned by Respondent in conformity with the pre-determined street line, which
in fact .occupied the North twelve feet of the Respondent's property across the entire length of
their ownership.
In front of the western most property Respondent, in cooperation with Standard Oil of
California, its lessee, installed at the expense of
lessee, curb and gutter and in the process set the
curb and gutter back to conform to the require-
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ments of the City for a wider street than was actually owned by the City. It is the contention
of the Appellant herein, th at this act, done in
1962, pursuant to a plot plan presented to the
City, in connection with the establishment of a
service station on the corner of University Avenue and 1230 North, was an act of dedication nnd
would be so understood and interpreted both by
the public and the City. (see Trial Transcript
pages 76, 80 and 81.)
The Lease between the Respondent iand Standard Oil Company (Exhibit 14) in which the
Respondent was the Lessor and Standard Oil
was the Lessee, contains the following provision:
"Lessor reserves the right to convey the
North 12 feet of the leased premises
first above
described for
the pur,pose .of widening 12th North
Street."
Respondent claims now that there was no
intent to dedicat!,e, but it is the position of the
Appellant that the 1acts of the Respondent, in
fact, indicate an intent to dedicate as well as an
actual dedication and use by the public, of the
property.
The precise question has been before the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah many times,
for instance in the ciase of Mossis vs. Blunt, 49
1
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Utah 243, 161 P. 1127 at page 1130, the principle
is ex.pounded 1as fallows:
"A dedication rests primarily in the
intent of the owner. There must be a
concession intentionally made by him,
which may be proven by declarations or
by acts, or may be inferred from circumstances. No form or ceremony is necessary. It must, however, iappear that he
knew of the use by the public, and intended to grant the right-of-way to the
public. No formal acceptance by any
public officer or agent is necessary,
but there must be an actual use by the
public."
The Morris vs. Blunt case cites a number of
other Utah cases wherein the same principle is
expressed.
The case of Hall vs. North Ogden City) 175
P 2 (d) 703, at page 711, the Court further
states:
"Before a dedication of a street to the
public use can be effected, there must be
either an intention to so dedicate such
lands on the part of the owner thereof
or he must act in such a manner as to be
estopped from denying such intention.
Such intention may be shown by either
oral or written declarations or it may
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be inferred from the surrounding facts
and circumstances of the case, but in all
cases such intention must be clearly
manifest. (see cases quoted therein.)
In the testimony of Mr. Frank Earl, Plaintiff's President, he points out in several places
that a portion of the street in question was
'(lctually occupied by a series of utility poles and
though he denies an intent to dedicate, his acts
speak louder than his words. A reasonable interpretation of the lease provision above-quoted,
would also indicate 1an intent to dedicate to the
public, consistent with the installation of expensive curb and gutter. The existence of this type
of an improvement when made by the owner can
only be interpreted by the public as an intent to
establish a new street line regardless of technical
ownership boundaries.
As in all cases the law must go by the acts
of the person in question rather than by his interpretation of his intention given years after
the iact.
The question of intent to dedicate is exhaustively discussed in McQuillin's "Municipal
Corporations", Third Revised Edition, Vol. 11,
Section 33.30, beginning at Page 702 and indicates a number of ways in which the intent to
1
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dedicate can be shown, they are enumerated as
follows:
"First, the intent may be shown by a
written instrument, executed especially
for the purpose of dedic1ating land to the
public, for instance, where a plat is executed and recorded as provided for by
st1atute so as to constitute a statutory
dedication.
Second, the intent of the owner to dedicate may be evidence by his express act
in filing a pZat or map of his property
regiard to whether it is suf ficient as a sta,tutory plat, where it shows
thereon certain places designated as
streets, alleys, parks etc. This is one of
the clearest ways of declaring an intention to dedicate. (Emphasis supplied).
Third, if the owner plats his property
and then sells lots pursuant to the plat ...
Fourth, the intent to dedic1ate may be
shown by recitals in a deed in which the
rights of the public are recognized.
Fifth, the intention of the owner to
dedicate may be shown by his oral declarations . . .
Sixth, the intent may be shown by af firmative acts .of the owner ·in connection
with property, a,s by fencing a w.ay, or
like conduct. (emphasis supplied)
1
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Seventh, it is generally held that the intent may be shown by the acquiescence
of the ownr in the owner in the use of his
property by the public."
There is in addition to the above, an equitable doctrine of dedication under the theory of
Estoppel. McQuillin at section 33.63, beginning
\vi th page 802, states:
"One claimed to have dedicated land to
the public may be estopped by his acts
and conduct to deny the dedication, and
this applies as well to 1a corporation, as
to individuals, and binds not only the
dedicator but his successors in interest."
The McQuillin text quotes the case of Premium Oil Company vs. Cedar City, 112 Utah 324,
187 P. 2 ( d) 199, as adopting the doctrine of equitable estoppel to deny a dedioation. That doctrine
discussed at length in the case of Schettler vs.
Lynch, 23 Utah 305, 64 P. 955, in these words:
"l. A dedication of land for a public
highway may be either express-as where
the owner manifests his purpose by
a grant, evidenced by a writing-or implied, where the acts and conduct of the
owner clearly manifests the intention
on his part to devote the land to the public use; but in either case it is always
question of intention, and no particular
formality or form of words is necessary.
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2. An implied dedication is founded on
the doctrine of equitable Estoppel, and
when land has been thus set apart
as a highway for the use, convenience,
and accommodation of the public and
enjoyed as such, the law considers it in
the nature of an estoppel in pais, which
precludes the original owner from revoking such dedication.
3. An implied dedication of land as a
highway is not within the Statute of
Frauds, and mtay be established by parole or in any conceivable way by which
the intent of the owner can be made apparent.
4. Where land has been set a part by the
owner for the public use as a highway
and accepted by the public, the right of
the public does
depend upon .a ten or
twenty year user or possessi!01n; the dedi-

cation may b e inferred from long continued use by the public with the knowledge of the owner, 1and without objection
by him.
5. Wh1ere the evidence shows such a
course of conduct and such acts respecting the Jand in controversy as clearly
manifest an intention on the part of the
owner to appropriate it to the public
use as a highway, and such as were
1
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calculated to induce people to believe
that the land was devoted to such
purpose, and lull them into security
as to any rights they might acquire
with reference thereto, the law will
imply a dedication." (emphasis supplied.)
The Schettler case is very similar to the ciase
now before the Court in that there was in existence and use a very narrow road prior to the
commercial development of the property. In
the Schettler case the pro,perty owner included
a twelve foot strip of his property within the
street by building a board fence.
It is submitted that the installation of curb
and gutter is much more of a permanent improvement than a wooden fence as was f.ound
sufficient in the Schettler case to imply a dedication.
The only objection or reservation so far as
the continual public use of the property in the
instant case is concerned, if it existed at all,
existed only in the mind of Mr. Frank Earl, President of the Respondent Corpoffation.
He voluntarily set back to a predetermined
street line in three separate instances and obtained building permits consistent therewith, (see
Trial transcript page 113). His acts as early as
1959, despite statement to the contrary, indicat-
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ed a definite intention to dedicate the additional
street width to the public.
It was not until years later in 1968, when
this case was filed, that he expressed an intent
to deny the City the right to use the Northern
twelve feet of his property for street purposes.
The first time he brought any objection to the
use was when the City Commissioner 1and City
Engineer requested an additional one foot across
the frontage of his property so as to make room
for a sidewalk.
This coupled with the provision above quoted from the lease which Mr. Eiarl negotiated on
behalf of his corporation with Standard Oil of
Oalifornia could be interpreted in no other way
than an intent to dedicate. The only reservation
he had was that he intended at sometime to get
money from the City but this was never disclosed or discussed until years later.
The Court below, sitting without a jury
erred in refusing to take into consideration these
acts of the property owner and construing them
to be a dedication; this being 1an action in equity,
it is appro.priate to have the same facts considered by the Court on appeal, as stated in McQuil·
lin, Section 33.41 beginning at page 730.
"If the evidence is conflicting the ques-
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tion is one .of fact for the consideration
of the jury, but if the facts are undisputed the question is one of law for the
Court as previously noticed, the construction of a plat is generally one of
law for the Court."
In each instance that the property owner applied for a building permit he submitted a plat
for approval to the City as a condition for obtaining a permit and each of the pl1ats showed a
set back to the wider width street line demianded
by the City and in fact was an acquiesence to the
City's need for a wider street in order to service
the pr.operty of the Respondent.
All of the facts before the Court indicate
that there was an acceptance of the dedication
and that the City has, as far back as 1958 treated the full 100 foot width street as having been
dedicated to the City and accepted by the City
and was in fact improved by the City with full
width hardsurfacing, curb, gutter 1and sidewalk.
In all regards the property was treated exactly
the same as the neighboring property.
POINT III
WHEN A CITY WIDENS A STREET
BY OCCUPYING PRIVATE PROPERTY, IS THE CITY ENTITLED TO OFFSET AGAINST THE VALUE OF THE
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PROPERTY TAKEN, SPECIAL BENEFITS CONFERRED ON THE BALANCE OF THE PROPERTY?
The Court below in its supplement memorandum decision (R-21) found that as 1a matter
of liaw no consideration could be given to the
Appellant herein for special benefits, since in the
opinion of the Court, special benefits are deductible only against severance damages and not for
land values found and determined by the Court.
The Court in making its determination depended on Section 78-34-10, UCA, 1953 as amended, and refused to allow :a set-.off for an acknowledged improvement of the property beciause of
the reading of that statute.
The Court made a basic error in relying upon
the Eminent Domain statute of Utah, in making this determination. This is not an action
under statute but is an action in equity and the
position of the Court below ignores the rather
basic distinction between an action pursuant to
a statute and an action in equity.
Respondent herein has asked the Court to
grant compensation for a taking of property by
the Municipality, but denies the Municipality
any right for off-set for benefits conveyed and
capitalized on by the Respondent in developing
its property. The determination of this question
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is not one of statutory construction, but is one
of determining whether it is fair to have the Respondent compensated in the 1amount of $17,350.37 for a piece of pr.operty 13 feet wide and
271 feet long and yet ignore an uncontested increase of value to the remaining property which
has a much larger areia and according to the only
evidence before the Court given by Appraisers
Tug Jacobsen and Ward Heal, the entire remaining property was benefited to the extent of fifteen percent increase in value. It is also pointed
out to the Court that the judgment entered by the
lower court
that there was a taking as of
January 1, 1969, which purportedly was the date
of the taking, the evidence fails to show any
plausible connection between that particular date
and any act of the City which could be construed
to amount to a taking.
The only logical date for determining a taking by the City would have to be the date when
the first building permit was requested and the
City required that the property owner setback,
that date goes clear back to 1959. If the actions
of the City constituted an equitable taking of
property in the year 1959, then this action was
not timely brought, but is barred by the provisions of 78-12-6, UCA, 1953 as amended, which
1
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section requires that 1any action founded upon
the title to rt:;al property, must be commenced
within seven years from the time of the committing of the act. It is submitted to the Honorable Court as an item of equity to be determined here, that the date selected by the Court as
the purported date of taking was arbitrary and
has no basis in fact, upon the record, but was an
arbitrary date seized upon for the purpose of
avoiding the statute of limitations. It is noteworthy that the complaint on file does not allege
ai;ny specific date when the purported "taking"
occurred and it is submitted that the reas.on that
this fundamental date is lacking from the com·
plaint is the awareness of Respondent that the
action in equity was not timely brought.
Very likely this type of claim is subject to
the provisions of 63-30-6, UCA, 1953 as amended,
which waives immunity for suit against a govern·
mental entity for 1an adverse claim, if so, then
the suit is probably also barred by 63-30-15 which
requires that the suit be commenced within one
year after expiration of the notice requirements.
One seeking equity must also observe the ameni·
ties of the law and is bound by the same statu·
tory requirements of notice and timely filing.

25
CONCLUSION
The Court below has erred in granting an inequitable judgment to the Respondent, oompensating the Respondent without giving any off-set
for benefits which he admittedly has received.
This being an action in equity both the fiacts
and the law are before the Appellate Court for review. The position of Appellant is that the public have been mislead by the acquiescence of
the Respondent over 1a period commencing in
1959 up until the time of the commencement of
this action in 1968, into thinking that his acquiescence in observing a wide street width in
conformity with the Street Plan adopted by the
City and observed by all of the neighboring properties, had in fact, established a 100 foot wide
raad right-of-way.
Voluntary compliance by the Respondent in
building a number of buildings and establishing
curb and gutter, so that the public would see
and use a well defined and fully developed street
in front of Respondent's property, was in the
view of the Appellant a full and complete dedication, the acts of the Respondents having shown
his intent over a period of years.
It was only 1after the street was fully developed and the Respondent's property was fully
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developed, taking full advantage and benefit of
the public improvements, that Respondent made
demand for compensation for the property to
which he owns legial title, but which in fact had
been dedicated to the public use for street pur,poses for a period in excess of 9 years.
Public policy, equity and good judgment cry
out at the over-legalistic manipulations of the
Respondent herein in demanding full compensation for all of the property involved without
any off-setting credit to the public for the bene·
fits so richly enjoyed by the property owner.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21 day
of March, 1972.
GLEN J. ELLIS, Attorney for
Provo City Corporation
Defendant-Appellant
17 South University A venue z
Provo, Utah 84601

